THE New Republic

The Salk Vaccine: Whose Health and Whose Welfare?

PAGE 3

GRAHAM GREENE

Last Act in Indo-China

A Personal Report from Saigon On the Eve of "Anarchy and A Night of the Long Knives"

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Washington Wire .... T.R.B.

Having a President who is bored by the day-to-day operations of the government and who doesn't read much but Westerns makes a fascinating experience. It is the more so because Eisenhower is also a great national hero and an indispensable asset to the GOP without which they acknowledge they can't win. The final quirk in what is surely as bizarre a situation as American politics has ever recorded is that Ike doesn't find the job interesting enough to want to keep it after 1956, and will probably quit anyway if Mamie's health doesn't improve.

This situation has national advantages and disadvantages. With Ike in the White House, Americans can better understand what it would be to have a constitutional monarch. Ike probably dislikes politicians of either party about equally, but he is a Republican because he looks backward to the cherished simplicities of boyhood Abilene, Kansas, and because he has the professional soldier's awe of business tycoons. (Paradoxically, Truman had awe of the military brass.)

Like a constitutional monarch, Ike told his press conference last week he was a pen pal of Soviet Marshal Zhukov, and he did so with no more embarrassment than Queen Victoria would have shown in saying she was writing to a fellow sovereign. This cut right through all the maniacal fear of challenged loyalty like a fresh wind. Monarchs can do that sort of thing. Furthermore, Ike had had a good weekend at the Gettysburg farm, and nobody had warned him of political pitfalls in speaking out his mind on a number of touchy GOP issues. So with perfect simplicity he said it was a "blunder" to have issued that GOP political pamphlet on defense and security (this enraged Senator Bridges), that he thought the Refugee Act emphatically needed revision (this hit the Congressman who attacked Edward Corsi), that he opposed the Bricker Amendment (this got Bricker), that he wanted lower tariffs (this hit the big lobbies desperately fighting the pending reciprocal trade act), and that he felt the State Department's weekend statement—which in effect rejected the Red Chinese negotiation offer—was an "overstatement" (this, of course, enraged the Jenner-McCarthy-Malone-Welker group and brought the hint from Knowland that he might quit as majority leader.) That was a pretty good bag for half an hour.

The disadvantages of the monarchical, or "papa-knows-best" systems are also fairly evident. Take that item about improving the Refugee Act. There is no evidence that Ike intends to do anything about it. He is the constitutional monarch, not the prime minister. Something ought to be done about the refugees, obviously, but it is not his business. Not long ago he made a fine little plea against using the Yalta papers for political purposes. The Republican National Committee has gone right ahead so using them, and Dulles of course leaked them out for that purpose. Ike is bored by such matters in most cases; or perhaps he feels that a constitutional monarch should not intervene.

While Ike was at Gettysburg, and Dulles was incommunicado at Duck Island, Lake Ontario, some of the other Cabinet members got together and held what, in effect, was a Cabinet meeting. Treasury Secretary George Humphrey was, as always, the strong man. Among other matters they appear to have decided that Dulles should break his long-standing appointment to testify April 25 against the Bricker Amendment; small matter, but of some significance. Dulles was surprised at the step and quickly accepted an appointment one week later.

Again, while Ike and Dulles were away, the State Department prepared and read to Ike by telephone at Gettysburg a statement amounting to rejection of the Chou En-lai negotiation offer. It seems difficult to believe that Ike really understood what he was approving. He immediately reversed the position when he returned. Peace or war might have hung in the balance. Ike was busy with decorations at his new farm. Fortunately Sen. Walter George (D, Ga.) stepped into the breach. With a preoccupied President and an absent Dulles, George in effect became Secretary of State. He said the US should negotiate. We did.

Yes, this is a fascinating time in Washington! Because the President does very little reading the all-important business is to catch his ear. The hope of influencing Eisenhower is the hope of getting personal access. Sen. Alexander Wiley (R, Wis.) not long ago took a group of state officials in to try to educate Ike against the natural gas grab pending in Congress. They got a courteous reception, but Ike was flanked by advisers sympathetic to the big gas-oil companies. They have the last word. It was the same story on offshore oil and TVA.

Here are some shorter notes about the Capital. In Formosa tension is somewhat relaxed, and the face-saving process will soon begin; the Administration is making a major retreat here and forcing Chiang Kai-shek to give up Quemoy-Matsu which it earlier encouraged him to fortify and defend.

The disagreeable prospect is that Communists will take over South Viet-Nam in a year or two without firing a shot because of internal anarchy there; France will be the State Department's scapegoat for another big defeat.

The British Gallup poll shows the Tories slightly ahead of Labour but by a smaller margin than the same poll gave the Tories at this point in 1951, when Labour ultimately won. Saber-rattling by America right now in this hair-line division might give Labour the victory next May 26. US foreign policy is an issue. Also Ike must decide by May 14 whether to hike tariffs on British bicycles.

This column takes a dim view of Ike's plan to send the new, proposed, atomic boat round the world; what has this kind of complacent exhibitionism got to do with the actual values of the Cold War?

And just to wind things up, a new dollar-minimum-wage level is likely . . . Dixon-Yates seems satisfactorily stymied in pending court tests . . . passage of the tariff extension act looks probable. . . . And it begins to seem as though the other nations would let Red China into the United Nations Assembly next autumn over whatever protest America makes.

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BEHIND THE HEADLINES

The Vaccine—Whose Health and Welfare?

CHILDREN from the ages of five to nine are most susceptible to polio. There is now on hand in the United States just about enough Salk serum to inoculate this age group. But, under the "voluntary" distribution set-up instituted by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, packages of the vaccine have been going to friends of the drug manufacturers, doctors' children, one-year-olds and adults. The voluntary system is proving to be no system at all.

As soon as the announcement of the vaccine's success was made, Sen. Lister Hill (D, Ala.), Chairman of the Senate Labor and Welfare Committee, sent a letter to HEW Secretary Hobby, urging her to call a conference immediately of professional and public representatives to devise an over-all distribution plan. Mrs. Hobby did call a conference—a private one of doctors, drug manufacturers and her own staff. Here the voluntary plan was harmoniously adopted.

But some 50 unconsulted national welfare agencies and labor groups objected. The adopted plan was, they felt, totally inadequate to the nation's needs. They recommended a federal appropriation to make substantial amounts of the vaccine available to state Public Health Services, which would use them for low-income and rural children to whom private medical care is not readily available. The 50 groups also asked Mrs. Hobby to set down a requirement for the reporting by retail distributors of what age groups get the vaccine.

The US Children's Bureau already has the power to carry out the first task. Each year it allocates funds to pay for free small pox and diphtheria shots administered by state Public Health Services to four million children. Manufacturers are now selling the vaccine to the National Fund for Infantile Paralysis at $2 for the three-shot series; an initial appropriation of $8 million would cover the first costs of the program. Indeed, Senator Hill, in his letter to Mrs. Hobby, invited her to ask Congress for funds on behalf of under-privileged children, but the Secretary registered no interest.

In her defense of the voluntary system, Secretary Hobby made a point of how well the voluntary administration of penicillin shots had worked out in 1952. In fact, however, Health Service doctors found stringent controls on penicillin distribution necessary to prevent black markets from growing up.

Now Sen. Wayne Morse (D, Ore.) has reintroduced a bill he first offered a month ago. This would set up a federal commission to allocate and set mandatory priorities for use of the Salk vaccine. The haphazard distribution of the vaccine in recent weeks underlines the need for effective controls now. The polio season is here; there has already been too much delay.

Resistance in Japan

THE FIRST official talks between Japan and Communist China began at the Bandung Conference and have been continued in Tokyo through a Communist trade mission. This need not suggest that Japan has turned pro-Communist, or that she is playing off one country against another. These talks, when viewed against a rising anti-American sentiment in Japan, reflect a deep frustration and torment which is ready-made for Chou En-lai's appeal of "co-existence."

Several divisive issues have arisen between Japan and the United States and are now the subject of negotiations between the American Embassy in Tokyo and the Japanese Foreign Office. They involve the costs of occupation, defense and trade.

Should Japan continue to pay $150 million a year toward the annual cost of American forces which are guarding Japan? Should Japan accept a debt of $600 million, repayable over 37 years at 2.5 percent, as her share of the American occupation costs during 1945-1952? (This represents a settlement of about 30 cents on the dollar for the cost of the occupation.) Should Japan buy $100 million worth of surplus food from the United States at an asking price of $85 million, financed over 30 years at four percent, or should the United States offer better terms? These financial questions arouse intense popular feelings because Japan is living under a severe austerity program, and any payments to the United States will drive still higher the level of taxes, and hence the cost of living.

But the wave of anti-American feeling in Japan requires broader interpretation. Those in Washington who have been following Japanese events see these root causes:

First, the Japanese are reacting in a natural manner to their contrived attitude of friendship for American military occupation. Military government is never a welcome institution, regardless of the beneficence of its controls. From the day the peace treaty came into effect

"This isn't the kind of blockade I had in mind."

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in April, 1952, erosion in Japanese-American relations was inevitable.

Second, the Japanese resent and fear their economic dependence upon the United States. In 1954 Japan had a trade deficit of $700 million, most of which was met by American military aid and American troop expenditures in Japan. The only escape from American dependence lies in a massive trade effort in non-dollar areas, including Southeast Asia, but such a Japanese trade effort must be accompanied by larger American aid for development in that region. The only trade outlet which does not appear to require American assistance is with Communist Asia, particularly mainland China. That, of course, is the most cogent reason for the new talks with Peking.

Third, the Japanese leaders want to spend their limited defense funds on a buildup of heavy industry, which could be used for armaments in time of war, but the United States has pressed instead for the training of 100,000 Japanese men, which is politically unpopular in Japan. The United States is publicly blamed.

Fourth, the Japanese are deeply contemptuous of the Chinese, see no reason why Japanese will not get the best of the Chinese in any negotiation, and are amazed that the United States is so apprehensive about Communist China.

The recent Japanese Premier, Shigeru Yoshida, gave vent to some of these feelings about China when he recently told the Foreign Correspondent's Club in Tokyo: "That country [China] has made no progress, no improvement in the last 1000 years." He asserted the democracies are frightened by the appearance of strength in China, and that Japan is "better informed" on Asia than any Western nation.

It was against this background of frustration that the present Japanese Premier, Mr. Hatoyama, made an election campaign pledge last February that if elected, he would seek recognition of Communist China and would welcome the regularizing of Japanese relations with the Soviet Union.

The talks with China are now here. Negotiations with the Russians are due to begin in June. The Communists may be expected to make headway if they pursue further the modest attitude shown by Chou En-lai at Bandung. The response of the non-Communist nations will be tested by the progress of the new foreign-aid program in Washington and overseas. The program comes up for discussion among representatives of a dozen Asian countries, meeting at Simla, India on May 9. There a number of Japanese proposals will be on the agenda. One is a project for better milling and storing of Burmese rice to make it acceptable in the Japanese market place. The capital would come from America, the technicians and training facilities from Japan. This is a pattern—American capital and Japanese skills—which Japan would like to see applied on a wider scale in strengthening free Asia. To the extent that it fails, the beckoning hand of Peking will seem to grow larger.

Talks With Red China

IF DIRECT talks take place between Communist China and the United States, we may be surprised by what Peking demands in exchange for a lessening of tensions in the Formosa Straits.

The demands universally attributed to Peking are surrender by Chiang Kai-shek of Matsu and Quemoy, American recognition of Communist China, and admission of Communist China into the United Nations.

In fact, none of these actions though welcome to China, is essential to the new tactics which Communist China demonstrated at Bandung. There, Chou En-lai demonstrated (at the Asia-African Conference) that China seeks, above all else, to draw herself closer to other Asians by diplomatic relations, greater trade and cultural exchange. To help accomplish this, in turn, non-Communist Asian nations, even those friendly with this country, showed a willingness to establish closer relations with Peking. The obstacle, however, is the United States.

First, no Asian nation which has a military alliance with the United States has recognized Communist China. This includes Japan and the three Asian members of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization—Pakistan, Thailand and the Philippines. Red China believes that the United States has imposed the non-recognition policy upon these countries.

Second, an embargo upon many kinds of trade with Communist China, originally adopted by the United Nations during the Korean War at American insistence, is still maintained. The American Battle Act also imposes upon recipients of American aid many restrictions on trade with China. These restrictions are impeding the Chinese five-year plan for economic development. They have largely dried up the flow to China of such primary materials as rubber and tin from Southeast Asia and heavy machinery from Japan.

Third, the United States is regarded as leader of the effort to cut off Communist China from world steamship schedules, airline routes and telecommunication circuits, and to curtail the regular flow of international visitors to Red China.

If China asks our help in changing all this as the price for a cease-fire in the Formosa Strait, she would be acting in a manner entirely consistent with Chou

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Volume 132, Number 19, Issue 2111

Washington Wire by T. R. B. 2
Behind the Headlines 3
The Limitations of Diplomacy 7
by Henry A. Kissinger
Last Act in Indo-China 9
by Graham Greene
The Professional Touch 12
by Richard Neuberger
Candidates and the Camera 13
by Walter Goodman
Books and Comment 17

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En-lai's performances at Bandung. And she would undoubtedly have the sympathy of many Asian nations who would like to see Red China regularize her relations with the free world. The difficulty is likely to be on our side. For it would demand a shift in the foundation of our Cold War policies—the "stand up and be counted" school of thinking on alliances and foreign aid, and the effort to divide the world clearly into two camps.

German Loyalty to NATO Put to the Test

THE SOVIET decision to evacuate Austria is well characterized by an American diplomat: the Russians had to discard one card so they discarded a 10; in their hand they still hold the ace.

The ace, of course, is a Soviet undertaking to unify Germany on terms that most Germans will find hard to resist. The offer may come at the meeting of the Big Four Foreign Ministers that is due to start on May 12 if all goes well at the preliminary conferences on Austria. Or the Soviet proposal may be delayed through the summer to allow the Austrian agreement to exert its full magnetic power upon West German minds. In any event, the old principle *reculer pour mieux sauter* indicates that a far more substantial Soviet offer on Germany may be expected than any advanced in the past. The disruption of the Western defense system that such an offer could cause would more than make up for the limited but significant losses that the Kremlin has suffered voluntarily in Vienna.

In the past the Kremlin has stood fast on the formula, unacceptable to the West and to West Germans, of a coalition government of East and West Germans that would supervise "free" elections for all Germany. Now, in the opinion of the experts of Britain, France, West Germany and the US who are meeting to consider what may come, the Kremlin is likely to advance toward the proposals advanced by Sir Anthony Eden at the last conference of the Big Four in Berlin. There Eden called for a staged progression toward unification in which the principal steps were free elections for a Constituent Assembly, a provisional authority chosen by the Assembly to guide Germany in the preparation of a constitution, further elections under the provisions of the new constitution and finally the formation of a constitutional government for all Germany.

For the Kremlin, certainly, any such progression would be far more painful than the Soviet evacuation of Austria. It would require the liquidation of a satellite regime. It would involve the loss of important resources including uranium mines. It would restore close to the plains of Western Russia a nation of 70 million whose armies have invaded those plains with a power and persistence that no Russian will forget. If it is to suffer these setbacks, the Kremlin will demand substantial concessions in return.

The concessions fall into four main categories: the limitation of Germany's eastern frontiers; the restriction and control of German armed forces; the evacuation of Western troops from Germany; and the withdrawal by Germany from military and political alignments with the NATO powers. Among these concessions, those that seem acceptable to the NATO powers are unacceptable to the Germans, while those that the Germans might risk, the NATO nations feel they must reject.

The recognition that Germany's eastern frontier will not extend to the territories now held by Poland is a logical part of peace-making that many Westerners feel Germany would be wise to accept. But no German political party that hopes to form a government will agree. The restriction of German armaments by a four-power agreement is more acceptable to Germany and her present allies, but to the Russians (who have sanctioned a German national army) it is probably far less important than the dismantling of Germany's alliances with the West.

The withdrawal of Western troops from Germany and the severance of German ties with NATO is a price that the Pentagon and France would veto, if necessary, despite German desires. The cost they find intolerable is not the loss of the 12 German divisions. It is the destruction of the NATO system for the defense of Europe, in which German territory and manpower form part of a total pattern, and the further destruction of the guarantees to which the French attach such importance that an independent Germany would not shift to the Soviet side.

A Soviet withdrawal from Germany has presumably been our primary objective since the war. In particular, to the extent that it is motivated by the overextension of the Kremlin rather than its ambition to advance further into Europe, it is worth encouraging by bold and imaginative strokes. The first faint gestures were made two years ago in the suggestions of an Eastern Locarno. It was intended to offer to more moderate groups within the Soviet regime some new assurance of its security within its borders in exchange for the loss of security suffered by the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Europe. Suddenly these gestures have been made more meaningful by the agreement on Austria. The NATO powers, however, seem likely to wait for the Soviet offer, and to resist it, even if this means exposing the Chancellor and all pro-Western forces in Germany to political defeat. Mr. Adenauer has declared that Germany's adherence to NATO is unchanged by the Austrian agreement. His major spokesmen in the Christian Democratic Union have assured anxious journalists that West Germany will not enter into bilateral negotiations with the Kremlin and will press ahead with its plans for rearmament. Those to whom German rearmament has become an end in itself may find these assurances comforting. German rearmament, however, will take at least two years, more probably four. Discussion is already appearing within the CDU. The British *New Statesman* records with some satisfaction "throughout the federal Republic the wintery climate of the cold war has suddenly changed, and Germany loyalty to NATO is breaking up like an ice-floe in spring."

Britain: Who's Left?

IN BRITAIN, where government policy is narrowly circumscribed by necessity, the Conservative and Labour Parties are searching for issues in the campaign that ends on May 26. The independent vote, which will determine the outcome, remains Left of Center. Both parties are bidding for its support.

The Conservative Party is centering its campaign in its three-year record of rising industrial production. An expanding economy is its keynote, and it promises to maintain expansion by more [illegible] and modernization.

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tion of roads and railroads and a continuation of its past successes in cutting taxes and abolishing restrictive controls.

The Labour Party, in turn, is being carried further to the left by Mr. Attlee in an effort to disparage the Tory Party and to re-establish its claim upon power. Aneurin Bevan has celebrated his return to the official fold by calling the Tories "morons" and comparing them to the Gadarene swine.

Former Prime Minister Attlee for his part has entrusted the preparation of the party's election manifesto to two of the most eloquent and doctrinaire of the Bevanites, Tom Driberg and R. H. S. Crossman.

Labour's orators deny the Tory government credit for the rise in production which they attribute to a fortuitous and passing advantage earned in the terms of British trade. They blame on the Government the rise in the cost of living which in fact is attributable substantially to wage increases. The Labour Party promises, in office, to re-nationalize the steel industry and road haulage and further to nationalize Britain's thriving chemicals and machine-tool industries.

Labour is further pledged to restore guaranteed prices and price controls in foodstuffs, and to greatly expand social benefits. These are to be paid for by increased production and increased taxes upon the rich. "Which," asked the puzzled *Economist,* "is the left-wing party now?"

> . . . Is it the party that allows its every utterance to be crabbed by asides in favour of egalitarian stagnation or the party that claims to follow a policy of expansion for all? It is a strange election in which the nominally progressive party is calling for a defensive feeble and featherbeded economy while the normally conservative party is being allowed to monopolise the battle cry that a great prize awaits the bold.

Foreign Aid: From Hoffman to Hollister

OF ALL the officials in the Eisenhower Administration Herbert Hoover Jr. is the most inaccessible. Reporters cannot reach him, subordinates see little of him, Congressmen who press him in testimony take their choice between generalities and stony silence. His influence is substantial, however, particularly since Mr. Dulles is absent so often from the Department of State.

Inadvertently Mr. Hoover's actions and attitudes came to light when, without consultation or reflection, he rejected Chou's offer to negotiate on Formosa in a reply that the President sanctioned by telephone and Mr. Dulles learned of on his return from a weekend at Duck Island. Mr. Hoover's actions were reversed on that occasion. But once again his hand and that of his father are evident in the President's choice of John B. Hollister to succeed to the post in charge of overseas aid that once was given brilliance and honor by Paul Hoffman.

Mr. Hollister is a former law partner of the late Sen. Robert Taft and, like Taft, a long-time opponent of large-scale foreign aid. More recently he has served as executive director of the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government headed by Herbert Hoover Senior. The Hoover Commission under Mr. Hollister's management is completing an extremely critical study of foreign aid. The task force responsible for this study is led by a discharged employee of the Foreign Operations Administration whose reputation was established by providing Sen. Styles Bridges with derogatory information against the agency and its program. Mr. Hollister appears quite clearly to be the spokesman of the group within the Republican Party that is most strenuously opposed to substantial foreign aid. That perhaps is what an administration dedicated to opposing appeasement has in mind. Others may conclude that for President Eisenhower to appoint Mr. Hollister to head the foreign-aid program at the moment when he calls for its expansion is like asking Henry Ford III to direct General Motors' efforts to increase its sales.

It seems legitimate to ask which group is more important to the President and Mr. Dulles, the handful of right-wing Republicans in the Senate, or the 800 million Asians the new program is intended to aid? Mr. Hollister may of course bloom in his new job and in blooming bind his die-hard isolationist friends in and out of the Senate to a generous aid program. Meanwhile Washington observers who supposed that morale among the foreign-aid officials could drop no further concede in the light of the Hollister appointment that they were obviously wrong.

Radiation and Mutation

NOT ONLY won't your genes be damaged by radiation, but your descendants may come out healthier if you've had a big enough dose. So run current arguments designed to soothe public concern over the possible effects of the test atomic blasts being set off on the Arizona desert.

Referring to these rosy defenses of radiation, Professor H. G. Muller of Indiana University told the National Academy of Sciences in Washington that they hold good for fruit flies but not for human beings. Their effect, he warned, may be to make the public receptive to the exaggerated counterclaim "that the hereditary constitution of all of humanity is being seriously undermined by our tests of hydrogen bombs and that the tests should be stopped for this reason." Professor Muller won the Nobel Prize in 1946 for proving that x-rays produce mutations, or changes in the genes, the heredity-controlling factors in reproductive cells.

Speaking of Hiroshima, he said: "The numerous disabilities and deaths among Hiroshima survivors will be spread out very thin over a large number of generations. The effect in any one individual usually will be slight, although enough finally to extinguish his line of descent. Therefore, the over-all cost, although great, will be too scattered and insidious to affect the population as a whole noticeably."

Professor Muller agreed with the Atomic Energy Commission that the effect of recent test blasts on the US population was only a thousandth as great as that concentrated on the Japanese City.

"This certainly does not undermine the heredity of our population as a whole significantly," Muller said, but added: "Each individual harmful mutation is, however, an evil, and we have no right to dismiss it lightly. Therefore we must base our case for the continuance of the tests squarely on the fact that they are at the present stage necessary to prevent our being put at a military disadvantage."

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The Limitations of Diplomacy

by Henry A. Kissinger

ALL OVER the world great hopes are rising for an international conference to settle differences between East and West, and thoughtful students of international relations call for a return to the secret diplomacy of happier times.

The picture of an international conference reducing or even eliminating tensions behind closed doors is alluring. But it is one of the most difficult tasks of statesmanship not to let a vision of the desirable becloud its assessment of the attainable. And many of the advocates of a four-power conference, especially abroad, do not seem entirely clear about what they understand by a settlement, while the proponents of secret diplomacy in this country tend to confuse the symptom of stability with its cause.

If there did not exist any ideological conflict, current international relations would still be far from simple. Even in less avowedly hostile hands, the capacity for a surprise attack with fusion weapons would be a source of disquiet. And even in the absence of a revolutionary ideology, a Sino-Soviet bloc extending from the Elbe to the Indo-Chinese border would by its very strength represent a constant peril for all its neighbors. Moreover, diplomacy in a two-power world has an inherent element of rigidity. The classic balance of power had a multiplicity of components so that shifting alliances could compensate for fluctuations of strength. But in a two-power world any accretion of strength for one side is tantamount to an *absolute* weakening for the other. Regardless of the domestic structure of the two great power-blocs, all the pressures would therefore make for a quest for the kind of absolute security which testifies to the abdication of diplomacy. For diplomacy is the art of the contingent, the adjustment of ever-changing relationships within a framework considered as given.

But we do live in a period of ideological conflict, and this gives its particular urgency to current international relationships. It is argued on many sides that this ideological conflict can be eliminated by an act of will, that as during the 18th and 19th Centuries, we should conduct international relations without any regard for domestic institutions. But this would be putting the cart before the horse. The Eighteenth Century could consider domestic institutions irrelevant because the governments felt sufficiently secure to ignore domestic transformations abroad and because there did not exist a power which claimed both universality and exclusiveness for its vision of a just social order. From the moment that France insisted on the universal applicability of its maxims and set about to subvert existing institutions, the intricate maneuvers of Eighteenth Century diplomacy failed in limiting the scope of international conflicts. And the diplomatic methods appropriate to the 19th Century proved unequal to the situation after 1918 precisely because World War I had so shaken the structure of the international order that what was at issue was no longer the adjustment of differences within a system of equilibrium, but the equilibrium itself.

To be sure, the realization of the limits of diplomacy is not easy to come by. Lulled by the memory of a stability which has seemed permanent, the powers which represent the status quo tend to seek security in inactivity and to mistake impotence for lack of provocation. They will begin by treating the revolutionary power as if its protestations were merely tactical; as if it were motivated by specific grievances to be assuaged by individual concessions. "Appeasement" where it is not a device to gain time is the inability to come to grips with a foreign policy of unlimited objectives.

BUT DID not Europe end its two great revolutionary upheavals by diplomatic congresses? Was not the Reformation concluded by the Treaty of Westphalia and the French Revolution by the Congress of Vienna? It is true that after each of these great settlements Europe knew a stability which lasted for more than a century. But it is equally true that these settlements came at the end of a series of devastating wars. Only after the *physical* impossibility of the revolutionary goals had been demonstrated did its political corollary find acceptance. Diplomacy in the classic sense is therefore possible only when there does not exist a power so dissatisfied that, like Germany after the Treaty of Versailles, it expresses its dissatisfaction in a revolutionary foreign policy, nor a power claiming such a degree of universality for its notion of social justice that it threatens to subvert the domestic institutions of all other states.

In the absence of an agreement about the legitimacy of the international settlement, the relations of the powers are not diplomatic but revolutionary even if physical conflict is temporarily delayed. Because each side will then consider the claims of the other illegitimate, diplomatic conferences become sterile repetitions of basic positions and invocations of bad faith, of allegations of "unreasonableness" and "subversion." When there is no agreement on the general framework, no basis for a settlement

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exists. Adjustments may occur, but they will be conceived as tactical in order to consolidate positions for a showdown. To be sure, the revolutionary power may well be sincere in its protestations of being threatened. But the key to a revolutionary situation is not that a power feels threatened—this is inherent in an international system based on sovereign states—*but that nothing can reassure it.* Diplomacy, the art of restricting the exercise of power, of keeping power potential, cannot function when risks are so fearful. Instead power is made actual and diplomacy is replaced by war or by an armament race.

THESE are not pleasing prospects. In the age of nuclear weapons, it need hardly be added that a relaxation of tensions must be the goal of everyone concerned with the survival of civilization. But if we look for universal panaceas without regard for the causes underlying our difficulties, we may fail to achieve the degree of relaxation which is possible. As long as Soviet armies stand in the center of Europe, the international equilibrium will be precarious. As long as China towers over the uncommitted in Asia, they will seek their safety in neutralism. To be sure, it is conceivable that the ruling groups in both the USSR and China may become interested in local adjustment. It is not beyond the realm of the possible even that the Sino-Soviet bloc may undergo a domestic change in a less ideological direction. To the extent that these events occur, the US should be prepared to negotiate and even to develop face-saving formulae which do not turn every dispute into issues of prestige inhibiting concessions. But the proponents of four-power meetings, especially abroad, go further; they speak as if a "meeting at the summit" could settle all outstanding disputes at one fell swoop by some magic inherent in the very process of negotiation. They forget that diplomacy presupposes prior agreement on fundamentals which diplomacy can adjust but not create.

Are we to despair then in the conduct of our foreign relations? In a sense, to be sure, the question of the easing of tension is closely connected with our military potential and that of the remainder of the Free World. Only by building an adequate capacity to resist aggression can we discourage Sino-Soviet probing actions and pose the risks which make local accommodations possible. Indeed, perhaps the most serious indictment of US policy over the past two years has not been that it has relied too little on diplomacy, but that it has done so too much, that it has asked diplomacy to accomplish by itself what requires the integration of all national resources. By reducing our military budget we have been forced into attempting to substitute finesse for resolution during all international crises.

Nevertheless, the difficulties encountered by our coalition policy may at the same time define the greatest opportunity for US diplomacy. For in a revolutionary period the most fruitful field of diplomacy is not toward the opposing system but toward the uncommitted. It goes almost without saying that the US has been deficient in projecting the proper image of itself. We have forgotten that any act of a world power has not only a substantive but a symbolic significance, that it is the task of diplomacy to harmonize physical resources with moral aspirations. We have spoken of 12 German divisions; but the USSR has spoken of German unity. We have emphasized Quemoy and Matsu, while China has preached peace and anti-colonialism. We have reached the paradoxical situation where US intransigence has become the shibboleth of the very people who would blanch at the prospect of being left alone in Eurasia with the Sino-Soviet bloc, which in turn draws propagandistic advantages from proposals it can hardly afford to see realized, such as German unity. Ever since the death of Stalin we have been on the diplomatic defensive—and not because our objectives were wrong, but because we have been unable to project them among the uncommitted. It is in the area of the contest over the symbols that move humanity—the craving for peace, the quest for human dignity—that lies America's greatest opportunity. This does not mean that the US should be less firm in substance—Chou En-lai's performance at Bandung should be a sufficient demonstration that the most effective pressure may sometimes take the form of seeming conciliation. The task of US diplomacy is to adjust the form of US policy to the aspirations of our period, thereby to shift the onus for the present impasse where it belongs, to the Sino-Soviet bloc.

WE ARE thus back to the problem of negotiations with the Sino-Soviet bloc. While we should have no illusions that they will bring about a drastic amelioration of the situation directly, they may, if skillfully used, clarify conditions in their impact on our allies and the uncommitted in Asia. We cannot afford to reject proposals for conferences because they might delay our immediate aims to bring about mutual assistance arrangements. For if the Sino-Soviet bloc succeeds in capturing the peace offensive, these arrangements may exist, if at all, in a psychological void. If we do not lose ourselves in legalistic bombast, moreover, our position at international conferences is inherently strong both morally and in terms of the power we represent. Bandung demonstrated that we have a great reservoir of good will even where we are most vulnerable, if we but learn to tap it. And should the Sino-Soviet bloc sincerely wish an accommodation, it will find at such conferences the forum to make concessions with a minimum loss of face. Thus the greatest threat to the success of four-power negotiations may come from those who demand too much of them as well as from those who consider them an irritating interruption of more immediate concerns. The demand for total solutions will cause us to confuse tactical Soviet retreats with fundamental changes in position; while the refusal to negotiate at all may miss the accommodations which are possible and, more importantly, it will in time disintegrate our system of alliances.

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Graham Greene

Last Act in Indo-China

[In the New Republic one year ago, British novelist Graham Greene reported: "The last performance has begun; a country one has loved is about to retire behind the curtain." Now, revisiting Saigon, the author lays bare the story of dissension and deceit—the prelude to the total collapse of non-Communist power in South Viet-Nam.]

As ONE drove into Hanoi, the capital of the new Communist "Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam," passing under the portrait of Ho Chi Minh hanging from the arch of the great Doumer Bridge, one was aware after Saigon—whether one liked it or not—of a simplification. The fields had been oddly empty all the way from Haiphong; at the border there were a few thatched huts and a lot of waiting taxis looking out of place among the flat fields of rice. Now that my visa had been granted, no one was curious: a perfunctory examination of a suitcase, a refusal to let me take photographs.

Then the red flag with a yellow star took the place of the yellow flag with orange stripes, and the empty fields began again—even in war they had not been so empty.

Coming into Hanoi, I noticed first the silence. The only cars we passed belonged to the International Commission. The city had lost its natural voice—horns, gears changing, brakes, rubber skidding on a wet road: it was like London during the blitz, but there was a silent sky as well. The trishaws circulated empty—how did the drivers live? In the main street the shops were shuttered, even the chemists and the cafes; the big French villas in the leafy boulevards were empty; mouldering already in the Hanoi March, hot and wet in the *crachin* when nothing dries. Suddenly I caught a memory as another great portrait dangled overhead: of term-time and everyone shut in the classrooms, the portraits of headmasters and famous alumni hanging in an empty hall—but one famous Old Boy had been removed recently like a disgrace. During my short stay in Hanoi I was to be reminded more than once of school, and most intensely in the presence of Mr. Ho Chi Minh himself. There were even those who had run away.



It is easier to remember than to see, and it was easier for me to recall Saigon and the South from my bedroom in Hanoi. There was little else to do, with curfew at 11 and the cafes closed—except one where I had drunk the last existing tin of beer.

This had been my first experience of Saigon in peace—if you could call peace an ambiance made up of rumored *coups d'état,* manifestations which did not manifest, anonymous letters and forged documents. (Sometimes these were of an odd naïveté: one leaflet purported to contain the orders given to a secret committee of assassination in Annam appointed by President Ngo Dinh Diem. "Methods of Assassination," it read, "revolvers, daggers, grenades, masks and false moustaches.")

It was surprising a short while ago to read how the troops of President Ngo Dinh Diem and the sect leaders had actually clashed in the streets of Saigon: I had not believed that this *coup d'état* would fail to be settled by the payment of piastres behind the scenes.

The sects had always lent the South an air of comic opera, but a comic opera written by a cynic with a story of treachery. The most "respectable," I suppose, are the Caodaists with their Pope at Tay Ninh, their female cardinals and the synthetic religion worked out by a civil servant in the 1920's. The most savage but ill-armed are the Hoa Haos, the Buddhist sect which boasts a woman's army under the general's wife. The least worthy of respect are the Binh Xuyen, former bandits who used to prey each harvest on the big proprietors of the delta: they control Cholon, the Chinese city alongside Saigon, manage the gambling halls, the brothels and the opium houses, and until their recent rising held office in the government of

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Mr. Diem. The *Sureté* they had already bought as one buys a gambling concession, for so many piastres down, during the presidency of Mr. Diem's predecessor, Prince Buu Loc, one of the least creditable bargains in a political history seamy enough. To mark his respectability as a minister, General Bay Vien, the leader of the Binh Xuyen, closed the Grande Monde, the gambling centre of Cholon, thus sacrificing a great deal of his income, but to recoup himself opened a great new brothel containing about 400 girls—a brothel like a shabby garden city, little houses set among shrubs and flower beds, neon lighted so that the faces of girls and flowers have the appearance of unhealthy sweets.

THE French, in the desperate need they had of allies to keep the South quiet while they fought the main war in the North, armed the sects and supplied the leaders with money for their troops, but with the armistice payment ceased, French troops ceased to control the roads, the watchtowers have been left to crumble and anarchy has returned. Travel outside Saigon is less secure than during the war. These are feudal leaders who prefer to deal only with each other and sometimes with the Emperor: they have no desire for a unified country, their interests are confined to enlarging their own territories. Their feudal game (the old Provençal one of "barter, lands and houses") they play with the help of lieutenants they can disown. Though General Tran Van Soai, the Hoa Hao leader, took office in Mr. Diem's government, he kept the young Ba-Cut in the countryside ready to be a dissident whenever required, and if the Caodaist Pope has his official Commander-in-Chief, General Phuong, he has also his unofficial "rebel," General Trinh Minh The, who was responsible for the bombs let loose in Saigon in 1953 and who a few months ago disposed of two French officers on one sharpened bamboo—a local form of *shashlik*. President Diem bought his support, and his frequent changes of side since then have been conditioned by the amount still owing.

President Diem's dilemma is appalling. In his quarrel with General Hinh he split an already ineffective national army, and by forming Catholic *cadres* he has only added a fourth sect—the President's sect. Without unity his country cannot stand against the forces of the North, who have won a war against the professional armies of France, and yet his only chance of personal survival is to divide his rivals. Sooner or later any government must deal with the sects, and it is a hopeless dream to believe that this can be done without bloodshed. During the rising in Saigon, Mr. Diem had the opportunity and the will to deal with the most ignoble, the Binh Xuyen, but he was restrained by his American advisers and by the French commander, fearful of French lives and property, who is said to have withheld ammunition from the national troops. From the latest news he seems to have fallen back, with the Caodaists, on the old policy of bribery, with the poor results that were to be expected.

When Mr. Diem accepted power after Geneva, he had a long record of selfless nationalism in his favor. No one could accuse him of being a creature of the French (though many feel he has substituted America as the colonial power). Even his Catholicism to begin with seemed an advantage, for the South is tolerant toward any faith (or how could Victor Hugo be a saint?), and in the North where Catholicism is more native, serious and ardent, a Catholic leader might offer an appeal to the imagination and the emotions to rival Ho Chi Minh's. Indeed he may well have acted as a magnet in that enormous shift of population which has already drained three quarters of a million people from the North, two-thirds of them Catholic.

Yet it is Catholicism which has helped to ruin the government of Mr. Diem, for his genuine piety ("he goes to confession once a week," I was told by a Vietnamian Bishop and longed to retort that he might be a more supple leader if he went once a year) has been exploited by his American advisers until the Church is in danger of sharing the unpopularity of the United States. An unfortunate visit by Cardinal Spellman ("He spoke to us," said a Vietnamian priest, "much of the Calf of Gold but less of the Mother of God"), has been followed by those of Cardinal Gillroy and the Archbishop of Canberra from Australia. Great sums are spent on organized demonstrations which may impress the simplicity of the visitors, and an impression is given that the Catholic Church is Occidental and an ally of the United States in the Cold War. On the rare occasions when Mr. Diem has visited the areas formerly held by the Viet-Minh, there has been a priest at his side, and usually an American one.

IN THE whole of Viet-Nam the proportion of Catholics to the population is roughly the same as in England—one in ten, a ratio insufficient to justify a Catholic government. Mr. Diem's ministers are not all Catholic, but Mr. Diem, justifiably suspicious of many of his supporters, has confined the actual government to himself and members of his family. It is said that even his ministers have to bribe his secretaries to discover what State papers have received his signature. He undertakes personally the grant of exit and entry visas ever since the Governor of Central Annam absconded with his treasury—this adds to the difficulties of a man naturally slow in thought and action. The South, instead of confronting the totalitarian North with the evidences of freedom, has slipped into an inefficient dictatorship; newspapers suppressed, strict censorship, men exiled by administrative order and not by judgment of the courts. It is unfortunate that a government of this kind should be identified with one faith. Mr. Diem may well leave his tolerant country a legacy of anti-Catholicism.

The accusation you hear frequently from Vietnamian

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Catholics is that the Church has been made a political tool, that the name of God is being used to get votes. It was humiliating, as a Catholic, at a press conference of the International Commission at Saigon to hear a priest, representing some American paper which would have been more fittingly represented by a layman, rebuked by the Indian Chairman for tendentious and unfair questions.

WHEN we consider the political use made of Catholicism, the great flight of the Northern peasants comes first to mind. It was led by three bishops. The Bishop of Phat Diem and the Bishop of Bui Chu had deeply compromised themselves during the war as prince bishops with private armies who fought bravely on occasion against the Viet-Minh. No one has the right to demand heroic virtue of another, but the thought remains —if these bishops had stayed, would their people have left in such numbers and would there have existed in the North today strong areas of Catholic nonconformity? The Church has not ceased to exist in Poland. Some Catholics have stayed in Tongking since it fell to the Communists, and more bishops have stayed than fled, but they no longer represent a force.

The fate of those who fled is not a happy one. Once a week two American ships, the *Marine Adder* and the *Marine Serpent,* arrive in Saigon River and moor off the Majestic Hotel, each with 5,000 refugees on board. They are welcomed with bands and banners and rations and shipped off in lorries to the camps. Lucky the very poor who have less far to fall: a few unlucky individualists can always be seen camping all night on the pavements of the Rue Catinat. Some fortunate ones—but how small a proportion—find themselves at once in possession of cultivatable land, even though they may have no tools and the time of planting approaches. The majority live in crowded tents on the white sun-bleached roadside, often many miles from water, and with the savage sun making an inferno under the canvas from 10 till four. They lie flat on the ground with their mouths near the canvas edge to get what air there is, and the babies lie under meat safes to keep the flies away. They are 800 miles from their own fields, where the soil is rich enough for two crops of rice a year, from the graves of their ancestors and those close-set villages, unchanged in a hundred years, where they had lived behind a bamboo hedge like a child tucked in bed.

Sometimes a political priest has told them: "God and the Virgin have gone south, only the devil remains in the north." Do they ask whether God is still on His travels when the Commissariat forgets them for a day or two, or the supply lorries break down, and they have no rice or flour? And do they wonder sometimes where God will go next, if Ho Chi Minh comes south, and will they be able to leave with Him?

Catholics, especially the Catholics of France, have contributed generously to their support, and this aid is perhaps more appreciated than the aid from the United States, for it does not ask anything in return. It is difficult to feel so grateful when a gift is permanently stamped with the name of the donor. This is not the obtrusive spontaneous act of charity to which the poor are accustomed; the tents, the chicken coops, the packages of rations bearing the badge of American aid demand a kind of payment—co-operation in the Cold War. This irritates them more than the maladroitness of some American gifts. The razors for hairless chins can be sold again perhaps (though to whom?), and the cheese, after a vain attempt to use it as soap, may possibly find a market somewhere, and the white powder (that nobody tells them is milk and a few wily people may tell them is poison for their babies) can be spilt in the cracks of the ground and the tins scoured and used.

By the time Haiphong is closed in May—the last port of escape—perhaps a million potential voters will have moved south. There is land for all, but there will not be land in time, and under the present condition of disillusionment, would they even vote the right way? Already incidents are occurring along the road to Dalat where the refugees are strung out in waterless camps: a bus burnt with its conductor; a French officer who accidentally ran down a refugee murdered. These refugees are strangers, and they are growing restless and suspicious, and there are only 15 months to go.



Ho Chi Minh

If the Geneva Convention is to be honored, elections in the North and South must be held in July, 1956, but you will find no Vietnamian who believes that the elections will ever be held. Members of the government point out that they never signed the Convention; American spokesmen rely on the qualification that the elections must be free—a dangerous qualification which helps the Communists, for no one has the slightest doubt that Ho Chi Minh could agree to any form of supervision without risk; his majority in the North and South is assured. And what if the elections are not held? What hope is there of avoiding anarchy and a night of the long knives? No need for the Viet-Minh army to move South: they are already there. Two Viet-Minh battalions are concealed in Saigon-Cholon, and the countryside is in the possession of the sects who already have their contacts with Hanoi. General Bay Vien, the leader of the Binh Xuyen, has a son in the Viet-Minh army: the Caodaists have an alternative Pope in Hanoi, and Viet-Minh *dongs* are a currency as well as Viet-Nam *piastres.* Fifteen months to go —in Hanoi they can afford to keep the peace and wait.

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The Professional Touch



On my desk is a bill which I soon intend to introduce. The bill is terse and short. It merely provides that "any television broadcast of an address by or on behalf of a candidate for any public office shall include an announcement of whether the speaker is speaking extemporaneously or from prepared material and what facial makeup, if any, is being used by the speaker while making the broadcast."

During the 1952 Presidential campaign, the teleprompter made its original appearance—although it was seen only by the candidate and not by the viewing and voting audience. These people thought the nominee in the studio was speaking without benefit of notes, manuscript or other reliances. What a marvelous command of his subject he seemed to possess! Even the most complex statistics did not throw him! He never stumbled over detailed explanations of bristling issues. Surely such mental wizardy, carried into the halls of the harassed federal government, might be of vast benefit to the nation.

Of course, the candidate was reading from large capital letters on a slowly moving scroll, placed directly above the lens of the TV camera. All the work was done for him. Someone even turned the scroll at the candidate's regular reading pace.

Regulations of the Federal Communications Commission require today that listeners be informed when they are hearing a transcription or a recording, rather than a "live" broadcast. I regard it as far more important that they be acquainted with the artificial techniques used to prop up a man or woman who seeks to govern us. Facial makeup may not be as symbolic as a teleprompter or "idiot board," but is cut from the same fabric—namely, the warp and woof of the make-believe. The purpose is to present to the voters an unreal candidate. The nominee is deliberately separated from his normal frailties, whether they be of appearance or intellect.

What if an aspirant for high office has jowls, a bald spot like mine, swarthy complexion or a mole on his chin? Should pancake powder or grease paint conceal these imperfections? I am not one who would deny a nominee access to the makeup kit. It is his undeniable right to camouflage or modify what he looks like. Yet the viewing audience has an equal right, I think, to be informed that the candidate is using makeup.

I am not particularly disturbed over makeup *per se*. It is, rather, what the makeup actually connotes. Here is a man who may sit in the White House, the President's Cabinet or in the United States Senate. Before the TV camera he seems to be chatting away off the cuff about the gravest of topics—taxes, the armed forces, diplomacy, civil liberties. Yet he has been tutored in this relaxed and easy manner by Hollywood stars. He is reading from the teleprompter the speech written for him by political counselors or an advertising agency. Artfully-used creams and powder pare a dozen years off his normal appearance.

What is the real difference between this and the legerdemain which transforms a Broadway playboy into Renfrew of the Mounted or prepares a former chorus girl to be a heroine of Conestoga-wagon days? Is not the next logical step in this process to run for President some professional actor who has successfully portrayed Lincoln or Jefferson or Teddy Roosevelt? Dress rehearsals might then be held to a minimum; he would be all ready for the part.

The Republicans have developed political make-believe into a fine art because they have funds with which to pay for it. Yet the Democrats may have been guilty originally of creating this monster.

At the height of the New Deal, Democratic national campaigns usually ended with two full radio hours of top Hollywood talent. This would be climaxed by a high-level talk from FDR himself advising everybody to vote. It was effective because people never switched dials. The Democrats held them captive on election eve. But it introduced into Presidential politics the appeal of singers, comedians and dramatic actresses. No longer was a decisive new policy a 10-strike; it became more important to sign up the leading crooner or lady-fair of the season.

The Republicans have gone on from there. They have made the candidate himself do some of the acting. Requiring the disclosure of facial paint and teleprompters will not automatically prevent this mixing of the drama with our political campaigns. In fact, I'm sure it won't. But it may make the voters even more skeptical than they are. If this skepticism persuades the public to inquire more searchingly into the substance of what is said by nominees who rely upon artifice for effectiveness, it will have served its purpose.

Richard L. Neuberger

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

II. TELEVISION AND POLITICS

Candidates and the Camera

by Walter Goodman

"WILL the air waves be open to candidates on an equal basis in 1956 or will radio and TV outlets be available only to politicians with plenty of money?" This question, put to the Senate Elections Subcommittee on April 26 by Federal Communications Commissioner Frieda B. Hennock, has been bothering many politicians and observers of politicians since the 1952 elections. Although IBM has still to come up with a fool-proof gadget for measuring the potency of campaign weapons, the prevalent feeling around Washington is that television is *the* political weapon from now on.

It will be a shorter campaign next year in deference to this belief. The national nominating conventions are being held more than a month later than in 1952; several states have been obliged to revise their election by-laws lest the Republican nominee not qualify on time. In the pre-video era, whistle-stopping and barn-storming, modestly aimed at keeping up the spirits of a few hundred thousand of the party faithful, required an expenditure of many weeks and much energy. In the contemporary world, all a candidate needs to put his case before 50 million American families of assorted political hues is a spare half hour and a spare $60,000.

It being agreed then that television can introduce a hopeful into the living room, the question arises what he's supposed to do when he gets there. Shall he equip himself with charts, maps and a pointer and expatiate on economics and on foreign policy? Or shall he chat in an amiable way about things in general, mention his wife, his children, a neighbor or two, and possibly his church, smile and look studious by turn, sell *himself* rather than any particular argument?

A study carried out by the Department of Marketing at Miami University in Oxford, Ohio, on "The Influence of Television on the 1952 Election," offers some helpful hints in this regard to the prospective TV candidate. The researchers noted that the largest audiences tuned in for the conventions and for the closing speeches of the 1952 campaign and that these were the times when discussion of specific issues gave way to very broad generalities.

They concluded from their survey of the reactions of 450 Ohio, Indiana and Kentucky housewives:

> The election decision lay more in the realm of personalities than in any differences in platform planks or candidate proposals. In spite of Stevenson's effort to swing issues and "talk sense to the American people," only vague generalities caught on. Some panel members "feared a change," but most believed "a change was needed." To effect this change, furthermore, they placed faith in the personal characteristics and abilities of Eisenhower . . . they especially liked his sincerity, his friendliness and his humility. Since these were traits which the television medium helped in an important way to project, it appears reasonable to conclude that it was in these areas rather than in the area of issues, that television contributed the most to the final election results.

Practical politicians seem to have arrived at much the same conclusion. In March of this year, Republican Chairman Leonard Hall told a group of Republican women that they'd be well advised to choose their candidates by their suitability for TV appearances from now on. Mr. Hall may have had in mind any number of 1954 Congressional contests which lend substance to the belief that TV is best at projecting personality.

Take the case of Rep. Harrison A. Williams Jr. (D, N.J.), for instance, whose 21,581-vote plurality in 1954 was the highest ever attained by a Democrat in predominantly Republican Union County. A professional advertising man from Benton & Bowles took over Williams' TV campaign in his spare time. Operating under the theory that the same salesmanship that induces people to buy soap can induce them to buy a Congressman, he produced three 15-minute shows over WATV, the Newark outlet. Cartoons of a baby-kissing, cigar-distributing



Representative Reuss filming a TV show to send home.

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ward politician were contrasted with Williams himself, 34 years old, handsome, personable.

Although almost everybody in Union County—composed of several high-income suburbs of New York and two industrial areas—has a TV set, Williams' opponent, "Friendly Fred" Shepherd, didn't use the medium at all. A State Assemblyman for nine years, a delegate to the 1952 Republican National Convention who held out for Taft to the last bitter second, a man who started off his campaign by saying out loud, "I'm not going to spend too much time worrying about the problems of national government until I know I'm going to be paid to worry," Shepherd cut a drab figure next to the bright young Representative. Williams is quick to acknowledge his indebtedness to Friendly Fred.

Admittedly, the winner did a lot of extra-TV campaigning, too—on sound trucks, before factory gates, at afternoon coffee klatches; nor did the Republican split over the Senatorial candidacy of Clifford Case—a native of Union County—hurt Williams in his race against a stalwart of the Republican Party's right-wing. But, for all this, the attractive Democrat's spectacular victory against an unphotogenic opponent in heavily Republican territory chockful of TV sets cannot easily be divorced from his professionally planned attention-rousing use of the new medium.

In Wisconsin another youthful Democratic Representative, Henry S. Reuss, defeated incumbent Republican Charles J. Kersten after a hard campaign, which included 10 TV appearances. Reuss waded around in a polluted stream for the benefit of a cameraman; he narrated a film on a new high school; he was shown chatting with the postman, with kids at a baseball game, with workers at factory gates. He conducted unrehearsed panel shows at which small businessmen and employees were encouraged to speak up. As a part of a series of 24-hour electioneering stints, Reuss used a 15-minute telecast that opened with his family—wife and four children—"waiting" for him to drop in for a refreshing cup of coffee. On one occasion it happened to be the birthday of his three-year-old daughter, and he presented her with a large bubble-blowing set. As the bubbles burst festively around him, he informed his audience that he'd be at Third and Garfield in 20 minutes. When he reached Third and Garfield, there was a crowd gathered and waiting. Representative Kersten, meanwhile, was spending his TV money on delivering prepared speechs.

Sen. Hubert Humphrey (D, Minn.), who made wide and sometimes novel use of television during his campaign (one-third of his operating expenses went for radio and TV time), wound up election eve with a "This Is Your Life" half hour, during which his career was reviewed for the voters of Minnesota and old chums brought in from far places to say nice things about him.

This emphasis on personality is not strange to television; it fits neatly into the pattern of American entertainment. For the play is not usually the thing on TV—and even when it is, it's likely to be a play about personalities, not ideas. The Star dominates the 30-minute comedy show or the hour-and-a-half spectacular. An equally familiar performer sells the beer. How much more receptive the after-dinner parlor audience is to a pleasing face, a winning way, an affectionate family group than to a lecture on civics. Good-looking young men like Mr. Williams and families like the Reusses long ago established themselves as staples of TV fare.

This is not to say that the handsomer candidate will under all circumstances be the odds-on favorite in US elections from now on—although recent Congressional crops indicate a trend in this direction. Certainly the bald-headed banker with rimless glasses and a paunch, that symbol of fiscal responsibility, might hold considerable appeal for voters in a less prosperous era. Nor does the Eisenhower victory mean that "sincerity," "friendliness," "humility," are to be the criteria for the successful politician of the second half of the twentieth century. One can foresee a period when the self-confidence of a Roosevelt would attract more voters than the humility of an Eisenhower. One might even conjure up a less reverent age when the humor and literacy of a Stevenson could sweep the country.

The practical-minded Congressmen themselves were among the first to recognize the possibilities of television for their political futures and to strive to get into a position to exploit them. In 1947 the government bought out a recording service which had been set up privately to cut tapes for the legislators at a reasonable fee and send them back home to be played as a public service over the local radio stations. The House-Senate Radio-TV operation now has $150,000 in radio and movie equipment and is self-supporting. Every Senator and 350 House members made some use of the facilities last year and the latter figure will certainly be higher in 1955.

For $4.40 a Congressman can make a one-minute TV film. For a couple of dollars more he can have it shipped back home by air express where a local channel will fit it into a regular newscast as part of its public-service program. Many Representatives do this as a weekly routine.

Senators favor less frequent but more ambitious shows. Sen. Prescott Bush (R, Conn.) recently did two 14-minute films with the General of the First Army on Nike. Sen. John Stennis (D, Miss.) invited Secretary of Agriculture Benson to film a five-minute conversation about long-grain cotton disease. Sen. Thomas H. Kuchel (R, Calif.) delivered a four-minute talk for the TV camera on the part he played in enlarging the Long Beach Veterans Administration hospital and was seen receiving a VFW citation for his efforts. On their trips home nowadays photogenic Senators are greeted on the street by alert TV fans.

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Of course, these programs are presented as a public service only until the Congressman officially files for the upcoming elections. Then he must pay for time over his local channel, just as his opponent must pay for it. But, unlike the fellow who is trying to unseat him, he still has access to government production service at very nominal fees, and, more important, he has a long head start on the contender. The incumbent's election-day benefit from his regular appearances in his constituents' living rooms between elections is incalculable.

Whether or not it is the absolute political weapon that some enthusiasts maintain, television has, since 1948, come to be valued as a potent vote-getter by experienced tacticians of both parties. The more than $7 million they spent for radio and TV time in the last Presidential race will be easily topped in 1956. This year's Chicago mayoralty fight alone earned $100,000 for the Windy City's TV stations.

So marked has the improvement been in President Eisenhower's appearances that his advisors are now confident enough to have his press conferences televised (and edited to be sure). Analyzing this gambit in the *New York Times,* Arthur Krock—no man to go overboard about a novelty—wrote that TV

> . . . will fortify his [Mr. Eisenhower's] national and political leadership. Hence it will also promote the interests of those Republicans who are his followers. And, in the event he decides to accept renomination, it will preserve and augment the advantage he now has over any possible Democratic rival for the Presidency.

So everybody on the national scene—from the first-term Representative up to the President himself—will be competing for the choice TV hour in 1956, and the inequities and uncertainties which have appeared in previous election years may be expected to appear again—more unequal and less certain than ever. Right now, in the lull between the hectic Novembers, seems a good time to consider the television industry's responsibilities to the public during political campaigns.

THE basic requirement laid on a radio or TV broadcaster by Section 315 of the 1934 Communications Act is simple enough:

> If any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally qualified candidate for any public office to use a broadcasting station, he shall afford equal opportunities to all other such candidates for that office in the use of such broadcasting station.

In the eyes of the FCC, there is no such phenomenon as a "non-political" appearance by a candidate—and this means the incumbent—during a campaign. A station need not let any politician at all use its facilities, but an appearance by one candidate gives *every other candidate* the right to make his own appearance—at the same rates, at an hour of comparable effectiveness and for the same number of minutes as his opponent. The station cannot

President Eisenhower's Cabinet on the air.

demand the right to edit anybody's material in advance of broadcasting.

Thus, if Republican Harding pays for 8 to 8:30 p.m. of a Tuesday evening, then Democrat Cleveland and Socialist Debs and Vegetarian Gould are all entitled to say their pieces via the 8 to 8:30 spot on a week night. Charges must, by law, be the same for a political talk as for a commercial effort; but in practice the businessman gets a discount for his 40-week series while the politicians' one or two appearances come under the higher Class A rate. If Mr. Gould can scrape the money together, the station must cancel a commercial show, if necessary, to permit him a hearing.

In addition to the requirement that it make equal time available to all contestants, every station is obliged to provide balanced coverage of national issues all year long—including the autumn of even-numbered years. If the station itself takes an editorial stand on any issue—and it's permitted to take such a stand—it must distinguish editorializing from news reporting and must present the differing points of view.

A very conspicuous loophole in all of this is simply that Candidate A often doesn't have as much money to spend as Candidate B, and the assurance that a newscaster, even John Cameron Swayze himself, will paraphrase your argument for you is not much comfort when your adversary is making parlor appearances at will. Indeed, a wild accusation delivered over TV could conceivably prove the undoing of an accused who can't afford to reply in person. Even the man who can reply is tempted to come up with a resounding counter-charge that will make itself felt. A significant minority voice with ideas but no cash will be unlikely to get a hearing under these conditions; a well-financed crackpot can command as much time as any legitimate candidate . . . and more, if the station manager acquiesces.

Furthermore—large loophole number two—Section 315 applies only to the TV appearances of the candidates themselves. If the entire US Cabinet came into a state to boost its man for Senator, the "outs" would be entitled to precisely nothing under this regulation. As things stand now, the party in power can make reels and reels of TV news during the last week of October—with televised Cabinet meetings or non-political Presidential speeches or press conferences, for instance—and the right of the opposition to rebut effectively (or as

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

Representative Williams campaigns on TV.

effectively as possible under the circumstances) will rest on the conscience of network executives.

The men who run your local newspaper—owners or editors—can print what news they feel is worth printing and accept any and all advertisements they want to accept. Their judgment and sense of responsibility will determine the kind of newspaper it becomes. But your local TV station is not merely a private business; its proprietor has been granted a valuable public property, and with it he has taken on certain obligations to his benefactor, the US taxpayer.

Many station owners try hard to fulfill these obligations with straight news coverage, round-table discussions and the like. Stations have been known to refuse time to comfortably financed candidates and give it free to poor ones in an effort to maintain some sort of balance. But so long as the amount of money a candidate has can, and usually does, determine the amount of time he can exploit the medium, and so long as one candidate almost always has more money than another, equality of TV opportunity for political jobhunters will be a rare condition.

Speaking of equality, a look at the British way of handling much the same problem seems relevant. Each year the British Broadcasting Corporation allots a certain number of hours to political broadcasts by the principal parties. The number and allocation of these broadcasts is decided upon at a meeting between BBC and Labour, Conservative and Liberal Party representatives. The parties themselves choose their speakers and plan their shows; the BBC merely guarantees everybody a fair hearing. The organization of American radio and television and of American politics would make this amiable arrangement unworkable here in precisely its British form, but one may keep it in mind for future reference.

Several approaches to America's problem have been offered in recent weeks before the Senate Elections Subcommittee, headed by Sen. Thomas C. Hennings (D, Mo.). The most direct came from Commissioner Hennock, the lone Truman appointee remaining on the Federal Communications Commission. She suggested that stations and networks be directed to allot free time to candidates. The government, said Miss Hennock, could chip in if the cost to the networks seemed excessive. An editorial in the trade publication, *Broadcasting-Telecasting*, commented:

> . . . for the government to force broadcasters to give free radio or television time to candidates would make no more sense than to command newspapers to print ads without compensation or printers to produce and distribute handbills or posters at no charge but to themselves.

Democratic National Chairman Paul M. Butler told the Subcommittee that he too thought TV campaign time should be free and that the purchase of additional time should be limited or even prohibited. Sen. Carl T. Curtis (R, Neb.) questioned the government's authority to require stations "to give some of their property away without compensation." Republican Chairman Hall agreed with his Democratic counterpart that the expense of TV necessitates raising the present unrealistic ceiling of $3 million on spending by the National Committees for Presidential campaigns to "at least" $6 million. How to assure effective enforcement of such a limit has yet to be discussed, but this is the only approach that seems to appeal to the broadcasters themselves. They have a normal businessman's aversion to giving anything away or to being placed under further governmental regulation. A CBS spokesman estimated that a free-time requirement would cost the networks $30 to $50 million every fourth year and $10 million or so in off-year elections. He warned the Committee that the number of Presidential aspirants would be multiplied by the enticement of "this modern-day, electronic, free soapbox." (There were 18 Presidential candidates on the ballot in 1952.) On the other hand, the CBS vice-president feared that limiting the gift to the two major parties would kill off dissenting voices. He did not mention in his testimony that America's gift of TV channels is worth in the neighborhood of half a billion dollars a year.

THE Hennings Subcommittee hearings are timely. As of now, a man who can pay the price need never fear that his political opponent will get more or better TV time than himself. This is the sum and substance of the present FCC regulations on the use of radio and television in political campaigns. The cost of good TV time is famously high; the production of audience-enticing shows can run into many additional thousands of dollars. Since 1948, politicians have learned a great deal about employing commercial TV techniques in their vote-getting, and 1956 will surely witness the intensive use of these techniques by candidates on every level. Taken together, these conditions argue for an overhaul of the inadequate rules governing the use of our political super weapon.

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BOOKS & COMMENT

Editorials from Athens

by Ernest May

PEOPLE in trouble, Harold Nicolson remarks, like to read about worse trouble. Unhappy boys enjoy the sufferings of David Copperfield. Unhappy citizens draw comfort from the agonies of Athens described in Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War*. They draw comfort and also find parallels with their own experience and problems. So men have done for 2,400 years, and so Americans can certainly do today, reading the sparkling new translation made by Rex Warner.

History of the Peloponnesian War, by Thucydides, translated by Rex Warner (Penguin; $1).

Reading lessons from the war between Athens and Sparta is, of course, an old recreation. Eighteenth century revolutionaries, more classics-conscious than class-conscious, called France the new Athens. Englishmen sailed out against Napoleon, cheered on by poets drumming the new struggle with Spartan despotism and admirals quoting Pericles on the invincibility of sea power. A hundred years later, Kaiser Wilhelm read a letter that compared Germany's big-navy program with Athens' building of the long walls. He jotted in the margin, "How often have I quoted this example during recent years!!" Yet English orators were soon calling Germany the new Sparta and the foe of liberty. Western man seems constitutionally inclined to lend his national brawls the dignity of classical precedent.

American readers of Thucydides may have some difficulty making a strict analogy between their own struggles and those of Athens. The Spartans in Thucydides' narrative sometimes seem more like Americans than the Athenians do. Sparta's prime faults are stability and isolation. "What is wrong with you Spartans," her allies charge, "is the great trust and confidence which you have in your own constitution and in your own way of life. This is a quality which certainly makes you moderate in your judgments; it is also, perhaps, responsible for a kind of ignorance which you show when you are dealing with foreign affairs." Thucydides' Athenians, on the other hand, boast as Americans would not or could not do. "The reason why Athens has the greatest name in history," Pericles declared, "is because . . . she has spent more life and labor in warfare than any other state." In his famous Funeral Oration he proclaimed:

> There is a great difference between us and our opponents in our attitude toward military security. . . . Our city is open to the world, and we have no periodical deportations in order to prevent people observing or finding out secrets which might be of military advantage to the enemy. This is because we rely, not on secret weapons, but on our own real courage and loyalty.

The simple equation, Athens equals us and Sparta equals our enemies, is plainly false. Athens and Sparta not only differed from each other but differed from all the states that have since paraded through history. In such a simple equation, moreover, Athens stands not only for democracy, but also for Greek art, literature, and philosophy, products which Thucydides never listed as elements of Athens' greatness. The contest between cultures, indeed, was not even Thucydides' theme, and the modern who seeks a mystical link with the past had better go to Herodotus than to the grim, realistic historian of the Peloponnesian war, for Herodotus, the story spinner from Halicarnassus, believed that West and East were eternal antagonists in a battle between civilization and barbarism, liberty and despotism.

Thucydides wrote instead of anguishing conflict, not in our stars but in ourselves. He shows Greeks tortured by dilemmas, trying to make decisions that could have no good results, but only an outcome less evil than another. We respond to the agony of Greek indecision because we ourselves face problems that have the same content, where the consequences are equally uncertain, and the perils seem equally grim. We read of Greece's anguish with the greater interest, moreover, because we know the results of Greece's choices.

Reading the very first book of Thucydides' history, we see Athens choosing between war and peace; for Athens had to decide whether she would fight for a tiny and remote island, not much larger or more important intrinsically than the offshore islands of Nationalist China. This little island, Epidamnus, had been owned by a somewhat larger island, Corcyra, but had revolted and appealed to a greater power, Corinth, for protection against reconquest. Corinth had ordered her fleet to help Epidamnus, and Corinth and Corcyra were almost at war. The issue before Athens was thus much like the issue now before the United States. Corcyra was deemed to have strategic importance for Athens, as Formosa is deemed strategically important to the United States. To let Corcyra fall to Corinth would add power to the potential enemies of Athens, for Corinth was an important member of the anti-Athenian bloc. Athenians had to choose between the loss of military advantage on the one hand and the risk of a general war on the other.

The parallel is, of course, more striking than real, since China could, from her point of view, regard the Athenian dilemma as a parallel for her problem rather than ours. But the choices before Athens and the choices before us still seem similar: immediate interest at war with ultimate risk. Athens, we know, chose to protect her immediate interest. Resigned to a "general belief . . . that, whatever happened, war with the Peloponnese was bound to come," Thucydides relates, the citizens of Athens voted to fight for Corcyra. And that war brought to Athens great calamity.

When we read a little later on of the corresponding debate at Sparta, we are likely to be struck again by a feeling that Thucydides is editorializing about our own problems. Particularly is this so because of the charge laid against the Spartans by their allies.

> You Spartans wait calmly on events, relying for your defense not on action

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but on making people think that you will act. . . . You do nothing in the early stages to prevent an enemy's expansion; . . . instead of going out to meet them, you prefer to stand still and wait till you are attacked.

The Spartan tradition, according to this charge, seems much like an American tradition, and the principle offered as a substitute for this Spartan tradition also evokes comparisons. "The likeliest way of securing peace," say the allies, "is this: only to use one's power in the cause of justice, but to make it perfectly plain that one is resolved not to tolerate aggression."

THE principle is one that we have lately accepted, and most of us think it sound—the sober advocates of containment as well as the fiery preachers of preventive war. Yet Thucydides' account of the debate at Sparta leaves his modern reader uneasy. The plea for Spartan action seems somewhat specious. The necessity for it was far from clear, and, as with Athens, calamity resulted. Reading the Spartan debate, one wonders if the principle of resisting aggression is itself sufficient, if the fitness of the label "aggression" is the only necessary test to determine the justness of war. Thucydides suggests, in effect, that we scrutinize the cases that arise.

Elsewhere in his history, he recalls us once again to our Asian dilemma, for after a brief interval of peace the Athenians resolved on a campaign against Sicily. Prompted by Alcibiades, they sent their best ships and troops to this distant Mediterranean land. Athenian forces there became embogged in a long and bloody campaign. Meanwhile the vital Ionian islands and the city's own environs were left weakly defended. The Spartan allies thereupon fell upon Athens, and the city's power wasted away.

No one familiar with America's Europe-first *vs.* Asia-first dispute will miss the implication. For Asia, in our Europe-first orientation, lies, like Sicily to Athens, beyond the zone of American vital interests. An enemy holding Asia, in this view, could no more threaten the United States than an enemy holding Sicily could threaten Athens, while the United States might in the meantime face great peril through loss of Europe; an enemy lodged in the eastern Atlantic might strike the American homeland or secure Latin American positions near United States shores. Europe and the Atlantic, in this view, bear the relations to the United States that the Ionian Sea and the isthmus of Corinth bore to Athens.

Yet appealing orators like Alcibiades lured the Athenians into the distant and unnecessary campaign against Sicily, as the Asia-first advocates, in their opponents' view, seek to lure the United States into unnecessary commitments in Asia. Vivid incidental reminders of our own debates rise from Alcibiades' persistent use of personal pronouns, recalling General MacArthur's "I" for UN forces and "he" for the Chinese and Korean Communists. And the result of Athens' Asia-first decision is known. Her forces were trapped near Syracuse:

The Peloponnesians came down and slaughtered them. . . . This was . . . the greatest action that we know of in Hellenic history—to the victors the most brilliant of successes, to the vanquished the most calamitous of defeats; for they were utterly and entirely defeated; their sufferings were on an enormous scale; their losses were, as they say, total; army, navy, everything was destroyed, and, out of many, only few returned. So ended the events in Sicily.

Of course, the terms can be reversed. Sicily might be regarded as our Europe, rich in trade but too distant to do harm, while the Ionian islands might be compared to our Pacific chain. Seeming parallels in the Peloponnesian war may, like the aphorisms of Nostradamus, be read the way one wishes. But the essential issues remain similar. Thucydides' history, as he promised, helps "those who want to understand clearly the events which happened in the past and which (human nature being what it is) will, at some time or other and in much the same ways, be repeated in the future." His narratives unsettle us, force us to make comparisons in our own terms, and perhaps sharpen judgments on our own affairs.

Most unsettling of all, however, is the moral theme that Thucydides unfolds. Showing how the disintegration of Athenian power followed the disintegration of her ideals, he reminds us of the changes in our own country's moral weather. The Athens of Pericles at the outset of the war was idealistic. "Our constitution," Pericles declared,

. . . is called a democracy because power is in the hands not of a minority but of the whole people. . . . We make friends by doing good to others, not by receiving good from them. . . . I declare that our city is an education to Greece, and I declare that in my opinion each single one of our citizens, in all the manifold aspects of life, is able to show himself the rightful lord and owner of his own person. . . . Future ages will wonder at us, as the present age wonders at us now. . . . For our adventurous spirit has forced an entry into every sea and every land; and everywhere we have left behind us everlasting memorials of good done to our friends

When the Corcyrean and Corinthian missions appeared at Athens to argue the case of the small island of Epidamnus, the Corcyreans appealed entirely to Athens' interests, while the Corinthians appealed to law, morality, and past friendship. They were old allies of Athens, they said, and had aided the Athenians in past wars. They had legal title to Epidamnus, moreover, and the Epidamnian people were for them, while Corcyra meant only to reconquer and enslave her lost colony. The moral and legal duty of Athens was thus to support Corinth or at least remain neutral. "The Athenians . . . discussed the matter in two assemblies," Thucydides says. "At the first of these, opinion seemed to incline in favor of the Corinthian arguments, but at the second there was a change, and they decided on entering into some kind of alliance with Corcyra." Self-interest thus won a narrow victory over idealism.

As time went on, self-interest gradually gained the upper hand. Debating the campaign against Sicily, the Athenians considered only their interests. Old Nicias, who protested the plan, argued that so distant an adventure would endanger the homeland. He did not say that conquest would be wrong. And Alcibiades argued only that operations in Sicily would be cheap, easy, safe, and profitable. "There seems to be, therefore, no reasonable argument to induce us to hold back ourselves," he declared, and this plea won the day. Nor was such tough-mindedness Alcibiades' alone, for Athenians unnamed, speaking for their state, revealed the new principles of Athens in the dialogue at Melos. Seeking to persuade the Melians to submit to Athens without a struggle, they argued:

The standard of justice depends on the

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equality of power to compel and . . . in fact the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept. . . . It is a general and necessary law of nature to rule wherever one can.

To such a pitch had Athenian idealism fallen, and the doom of Athenian ideals was attended by the doom of Athens herself.

Again we have a feeling that the Greek experience is uncomfortably like our own. We recall the words of Franklin Roosevelt, setting the keynote for American policy in 1940:

. . . Life must be based on positive and permanent values.

The value of love will always be stronger than the value of hate. . . .

The value of a belief in humanity and justice is always stronger in any land than the value of belief in force, because force always turns inward. . . .

The value of truth and sincerity is always stronger than the value of lies and cynicism.

We recall, too, the Four Freedoms, the Atlantic Charter, and the Declaration of the United Nations, documents which declared the aspirations of the American government and people, even if they did not set the standards for their conduct.

Against these past professions stand present-day paradoxes like "mobilizing for peace" and catchwords like "positions of strength" and "massive retaliation." Pressed by what seem to be practical necessities, we open our arms to tyrants and turncoats who a few years ago would have been brushed off our back door steps. The most distinguished analyst of American policy, Mr. George Kennan, decries the "legalistic-moralistic" policies of America's past. With some residue of idealism, to be sure, he denounces "the carrying-over into the affairs of states of the concepts of right and wrong, the assumption that state behavior is a fit subject for moral judgment." And the music of idealism, audible still in speeches like those of Adlai Stevenson, is overwhelmed by pronouncements that remind us of Coleridge's lines:

. . . The sweet words
Of Christian promise, words that even yet
Might stem destruction, were they wisely preached,
Are muttered o'er by men, whose tones proclaim
How flat and wearisome they feel their trade.

It may be, of course, that Athens' experience seems like our own because prolonged war and demi-war inevitably sap away idealism. "Force and fraud," as Hobbes says, "are in war the two cardinal virtues," and after a time they leave room for little else. The apparent lapse in American idealism may, on the other hand, not be genuine. There have been epochs in our past when moral abstractions seemed relegated to the copy books, and we will not know our true condition until, like Athens, we face some fearful test. If France or Italy or Formosa should, for instance, submit to Communism or neutralism by free plebiscite, we might learn how we would respond to pleas like Alcibiades': "The fact is that we have reached a stage where we are forced to plan new conquests and forced to hold on to what we have got." And we might see whether the American answer, like the Athenian, led to doom.

All these thoughts provoked by reading Warner's translation are, of course, nothing more than provocations to further thought about our own dilemmas. We cannot apply the experience of Greece nor, using it, prophesy. To study the cases of Athens and Sparta is but to learn how much they differ from our own, thus serving, as Sir John Seeley said all historical study should serve, to show us how superficial are all analogies drawn from the past. And the thoughts provoked by reading this translation may result from Rex Warner's writing his own concerns into his rendering of the Greek. To Warner as to the earlier translator, Hobbes, Thucydides seems "the most Politick Historiographer that ever writ," and Warner is, after Hobbes, the most Politick translator the historian ever had. Ideas about current affairs are as easily drawn from Hobbes' version, almost as easily from the humane translations of Jowett and Livingstone, but not so clearly from the crabbed lines of the most-read edition, Crawley's, of 1876. The translator rather than the historian may, nevertheless, be the editorialist who turns our thoughts to present politics.

Still Thucydides' history seems contemporary, no matter how it is sampled, and so do nearly all the Athenian classics. *Lysistrata,* for example, worries the modern book-burners. Perhaps it is because the Greek writers took themselves so seriously. Perhaps they became the giants on whose shoulders, as Bernard of Chartres said, we sit like dwarfs, because they thought of themselves as giants, whose thoughts and actions were profoundly important. The war between Athens and Sparta was not to Thucydides a contest between tiny states, but a war affecting the whole of mankind, and his history, he declared, was "not a piece of writing designed to meet the taste of an immediate public, but was done to last forever." He sought to record the universal truths of politics as well as the transitory facts of war, still declaring humbly: "It will be enough for me . . . if these words of mine are judged useful."

Next week

NR's Spring Literary Issue, on May 16, will include an essay by Padraic Colum on Dublin's National Library in James Joyce's time; an article on Carl Van Vechten by Edward Lueders; a new Canto by Louis MacNeice; reviews by D. W. Brogan, Daniel Bell, Paul Engle and others.

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Offerings to the Bitch-Goddess

by Leo Marx

SINCE 1915, when Van Wyck Brooks published *America's Coming-of-Age,* much of our most imaginative literary history has come from the Left. Brooks, Parrington, Hicks, Matthiessen and Kazin, like Beard and the progressive historians, all have regarded class conflict in some form as central to American experience. But this image of the past has been fading for a long while. It began to fade in 1939, when the USSR disappointed many of its American admirers. At the same time a generation in the universities was learning to read literature in a different and exciting way—and without reference to history, politics, or society. The rise of the New Criticism, coinciding as it did with the passing of the Left, has meant the eclipse of the democratic-socialist tradition of literary history.

The Dream of Success, by Kenneth Lynn (Atlantic-Little, Brown; $4).

From their positions of strength in the academies and literary magazines, the New Critics helped deflate the prestige of the "liberal" historians. Nowadays Parrington's single-minded pursuit of the political meanings in literature is a stock joke in the quarterlies. But the New Critics provided no substitute for Parrington. Their indifference, if not hostility, toward the historical method, and their lack of a coherent conception of society, have kept them from literary history. The result has been an interregnum in the field. Nothing very interesting has been done in some time.

Now Kenneth Lynn, a vigorous young scholar from Harvard, has taken what may prove to be an important step. In any event it is a bold one. He violently rejects the Manichaean views of the Left-tending historians. "Even if the Left versus Right theory did make a certain amount of sense once," he writes, "it has long since become a sterile formulation which hangs around the neck of American literary history like an albatross."

This remark would surprise no one if it turned up in the *Kenyon Review.* But coming from Mr. Lynn, who seems even less interested in the art of literature than Parrington, it is arresting. He attacks the older tradition not in defense of "pure" Literature, but in order to square literary history with the latest in social science. His masters are Oscar Handlin, C. Wright Mills and—judging from his language—David Riesman. Like them, he stresses the unifying and indeed conformist tendencies in our culture. He is interested in the way the literary imagination has been molded by society rather than the active hostility of writers to society. Although there are unsatisfactory things about *The Dream of Success,* it is surely the liveliest contribution to the study of culture through literature that has appeared in a long while. Lynn's text is from William James: "the exclusive worship of the bitch-goddess SUCCESS . . . is our national disease." He begins with a brief sketch of the Horatio Alger myth, then moves on to an intensive analysis of the life and work of Theodore Dreiser, Jack London, David Graham Phillips, Frank Norris, and Robert Herrick. He chose these writers because they were most concerned with the theme of success. Moreover, all of them, as it turns out, "believed" in the myth—whether they knew it or not. To demonstrate this he moves back and forth from biographical, and that means chiefly psychological, to literary materials.

WE have, then, five case histories of writers who attempted to work within—or in Herrick's special case, against—the myth. Neither in their lives nor their work were they able to escape the dream's dominion. If they consciously rebelled they unconsciously yielded—or they destroyed themselves. Most of the evidence is convincing, all of it is absorbing. But it accounts, after all, for only five writers.

In view of Mr. Lynn's insistence, in closing, that the cult of success was (and still is) our *exclusive* national obsession, there is an immense gap between the evidence and the conclusion. To fill it he has constantly to present guesses in the form of categorical statements. With the cool assurance of an impressionistic social scientist, he freely attributes motives to individuals and vast audiences. Because Frank Norris contended that the novel must deal with capitalism, he infers that this was an attempt "to please his father"—a capitalist. Or the popularity of a novel is explained by the fact that in it "many Americans . . . recognized an image of their own increasingly bureaucratized lives." Unfortunately, *The Dream of Success* has a certain all-knowing tone.

And Mr. Lynn enjoys scoring points. He derides "two generations of critics" (specifically, Brooks and Kazin) for their tendency to "melt into tears" at the thought of Dreiser's heroine, Carrie. He says they should have "saved their grief" because Carrie was cold, incapable of love, a "gold-digger" who never wasted tears on anyone. In fact Carrie, like so many characters in so many novels Mr. Lynn discusses, is her creator in disguise. Dreiser was a "man of ice" who once admitted his incapacity for love. He, too, was avid for money, status and power. The point is that Dreiser's motive poisoned his work, and we must not pity Carrie because Dreiser's "sympathy was the sympathy of self-

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Two Poems

by Isabella Gardner

"Here is a candle to light you to bed
here comes the chopper to chop off your head"

THAT princeling bland with dapper smiles for daylit danger,
that dauphin gay as a dolphin at high noon,
in the purring night, pawed by the furry darkness,
howls mutely at the looming loneliness.

In his cold comfortable cage (unguarded)
bulging with beasts, pulsing with strangers,
in a ferocity of silence, it is his own
soft breath that pads and pants and pauses.

Bereaved and unbelieved, beset, be-nighted,
wincing from the awaited and insupportable pounce,
his little tender burrowing bones
bury him to bed.
No lance now bow of burning gold
No ewe no shepherd and no fold
No jerkin of green or coat of mail, no grace nor grail
Can celebrate or succour him. Fearful and frail
that trembling desolate and dear prince cringes on his cot
while down unending corridors behind an arras (innocent and not
unarrogant with unicorns) the fearless King and Queen
waltz sumptuously to sleep.

Mathematics of Encounter

TWO never-ever-will-be lovers each
thatched in a thicket of one-
liness, huddled in onlyhood,
reach eye to perilous eye and contract
in an absolute gaze, in a clasping
of I's, a wedding. In that (ah marginal)
marrying of marrows, flesh blooms and bells,
blood shimmers and arrows, bones melt
and meld, loins lock.
In that look's-lasting love is resolved
to one-plus-one, dissolved again to two, these two absolved,
and the equation solved.

recognition, not of pity—as the grief-stricken critics have assumed." The identification of the motives of characters with the motives of authors is the heart of Mr. Lynn's method.

Now in my opinion there are several things wrong with this critical procedure. In the case of Carrie, leaving aside my impression that Mr. Lynn has misread some critics, I would contend that pity is a valid emotion. Of course Carrie is not lovable. (Nor is King Lear.) But her loneliness and her heartlessness are pitiable. We have seen them nurtured, and the spectacle is a waste and a shame. Furthermore, it is frightening. We live in the same world. The disease is catching. And what of the final chapters in this novel, where the fate of Carrie and Hurstwood is made to exemplify the fate of all who sacrifice their humanity to satisfy some merely human need? As for Dreiser's own feelings about Carrie, even if we could know them, what is their relevance? When Mr. Lynn describes Dreiser's attitude as "self-recognition" I suspect he means "self-pity." For "self-recognition" constitutes high (and probably accurate) praise. Take the self-knowledge out of literature and see what is left!

The trouble is that Mr. Lynn has very little respect for literature. In this the New Critics are correct—it is the besetting sin of "sociological" criticism. When the critic works in the uncharted zone where literature and society meet, his desire to make connections invariably causes him to forget the ineradicable boundary line. Mr. Lynn repeatedly cites an author's work in direct evidence against him. In establishing the coldness of Carrie, Hurstwood and Dreiser, he describes a scene in which the two characters ignore the pleas of a beggar. It is as if Mr. Lynn has forgotten who put the words on the page. Behind this scene there is not merely the coldness of the lust for success, but Dreiser's recognition of that coldness—whether he was its victim or not. *The Dream of Success,* fascinating as it is, could have been much better had it incorporated the vital distinction between what a writer writes and the fantasies of a mental patient.

But Mr. Lynn, with the acrid, accusatory manner of an angry psychiatrist, probes the life and work of his subjects for symptoms. His aim, and it is an exciting one, is to show how the culture's myth operates within the psyche. In the first, or "from rags to riches" generation, the writers were on the make themselves. Dreiser, always afraid of poverty, came to identify pecuniary and sexual success. London, born a bastard, was tormented by his memories, and became a "brain-merchant." He made money out of socialism, and hence could never fully affirm the collectivist viewpoint. "Marx and Alger don't mix" is the theme of Mr. Lynn's most telling study.

For the second generation, the problem was to outdo parents who had done too well. Phillips was a "dream panderer" and "inside dopester" who satisfied bourgeois self-pity by punishing the rich. Norris was a "mama's boy" who wrote in a neurotic effort to gain his haughty, successful father's approval. On the other hand, Herrick's father was ineffectual, and he did his neurasthenic best to construct an alternative myth. In the end, each of these writers stands self-accused. They were sick men, their novels mere "masks," "disguises" which often "reek of . . . unhappiness." At one point Mr. Lynn catches himself, and says of a novel that it is "not quite so easily dismissed." The fact is, however, that in *The Dream of Success* virtually all novels are dismissed.

Perhaps I am being unfair. Mr. Lynn manifestly is not concerned with litera-

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ture in this book. He is a clinician, more interested in the etiology of disease than in the patients or their pathetic tales. As a result his method works best on writing of the more naïve, projective variety—the less artful the better. *The Dream of Success* may not tell us much about literature, but it says a great deal about America.

Indeed, one incidental reward of this book is the sense it provides of where we are and where we may be going. The book ends with a plea that we jettison the obsolete Alger myth and find one which better expresses the meaning of our culture. If Mr. Lynn is correct, the new myth will not incorporate the old idea of collective action in the democratic or socialist tradition. Well, then, what sort of myth is it to be? Mr. Lynn omits to say. Nevertheless, one cannot avoid the suspicion that a new fable is vaguely prefigured in *The Dream of Success.*

In any event, one feels in it the presence of another kind of Alger hero, the New Intellectual. Unlike the liberals whom Brooks or Parrington admired, or the artists to whom the New Critics are devoted, he is unencumbered by commitments, political or aesthetic. He has a knack of detecting motives. Mr. Lynn does not describe him, nor is he the man himself. But Mr. Lynn's book, in the end, evokes his image. A prudent quietist, fully aware that he lives in an age of conformity, he is proud that *his* conformity is willed. We all know him. He is the autonomous man, the cultural diagnostician as hero.

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

DIPLOMACY UNDER ATTACK

by Gen. Julius Klein,
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Sub-Committee on Armed Forces:

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DAVID LAWRENCE in an editorial
U. S. News and World Report **Feb. 11, 1955**

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Harold Nicholson in his EVOLUTION OF THE DIPLOMATIC METHOD, **published 1954,** says:

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The Crack-up of the Social Democrats

by Hans J. Morgenthau

THE intellectual disintegration and political emasculation of Social Democracy is indeed a fascinating subject for the political analyst, and nowhere more so than in Germany before and after the First World War. Here was in every respect the strongest Social Democratic Party in the world, strong in numbers, strong in talent, strong in discipline, and strong in the dedication of both leadership and rank and file to the ideals and the philosophy of Marx. The threat which that strength seemed to carry for the capitalistic status quo was perhaps most impressively and flatteringly reflected in the fear and hatred of the status quo's defenders.

German Social Democracy 1905-1917, The Development of the Great Schism, by Carl E. Schorske (Harvard; $5.50).

One of the tenets of Marx which was central to the convictions of German Social Democracy was the belief that the proletarians had no fatherland and that the international solidarity of the proletariat had superseded the traditional loyalty to the nation. Wars waged by capitalistic nations were by definition imperialistic wars in which the proletariat could have no stake. In consequence, the refusal to vote a penny for military appropriations became for Social Democracy an act of faith through which the proletariat reaffirmed its separation, in moral commitment and political action, from the "other half," the capitalistic half, of the nation.

Yet when the First World War broke out, all parliamentary members of the German Social Democratic Party voted in favor of the war credits, thus denying in one single act of national loyalty the whole theory and practice of Marxism. From that shock German Social Democracy never recovered. In its aftermath it split into three warring sections: the majority which placed itself permanently on the side of the nation, the independents who somehow tried to reconcile democracy and Marxist principles and whose main bulk was soon to merge with the third group, the Spartacists, to form the German Communist Party.

Professor Schorske traces the history of that split back to 1905 when under the impact of the Russian Revolution of that year a radical revolutionary group started to crystalize within the German Social Democratic Party. It is the author's main thesis, contrary to the prevailing opinion, that the split was not caused by the First World War, which only provided the opportunity for its realization, and that the battle lines were already firmly drawn when the war broke out. The author probes deeply into the doctrinal disputes, organizational changes, and social and political influences, which made the Social Democratic Party ready for the split when the external occasion arose.

Yet Professor Schorske does more than that. He gives at least an inkling of the tragic dilemma between means and end, which is inherent in the philosophy of Marx itself and which has either condemned Marxism to political impotence when it remained faithful to its ideals, or has led it to revolutionary victory over the ruins of its own ideals. In part, the disintegration of the German Social Democratic Party is the tragedy of a political movement which, being a permanent minority, is committed to revolution in theory and to democratic reform in practice. In part, however, it is the tragedy of a political movement all of whose factions are committed to the rationalistic belief in the ultimate triumph of reason:

> Where the reformists held to an eighteenth-century progressivist optimism, to the belief that the ruling class could be brought to see the need for the rule of reason and justice in the social order, the left radicals propounded the dialectic, rationalistic optimism of Marx: the belief that with historical conditions as their goal and the party as their teacher the proletarian masses as a whole would shatter the old, irrational social order to build the new one out of their own spontaneously released rational capacity.

Professor Schorske has written a brilliant, informative, and wise book. He would put us even more in his debt if he would continue the story of Social Democracy's decline through the Weimar Republic to March, 1933, when the executive committee of the German Social Democratic Party reached the nadir of rationalistic delusion by attributing the triumph of Fascism to the lack of the party's educational effort, and to the present when the Social Democratic Party, devoid of any political philosophy of its own, hits on nationalism as the best device for winning at least the next election.

Notes on Contributors

ERNEST MAY is a historian; he teaches at Harvard. LEO MARX is on the faculty of English and American Studies at the University of Minnesota. ISABELLA GARDNER is associate editor of *Poetry* magazine. HANS J. MORGENTHAU heads the University of Chicago's Center for the Study of American Foreign Policy.

ONE OF THE REVIEWS of John M. Work's new book, "X-Rays on Human Affairs," calls the book "sheer magic." That's because the book is so easy and enjoyable to read. It is a book of essays, light, heavy and medium, covering a large number of subjects and discussing many problems that arise in anyone's life. It will do you so much good that it will be worth a lot more than the purchase price. Order it at your favorite bookshop or get it by sending three dollars to Vantage Press, Inc., 120 West 31st Street, New York 1, N. Y.

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

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